THE ‘MAY CRISIS’ of 1915 led not only to the removal of Fisher and Churchill from the Admiralty, but also to the formation of a coalition government. With Churchill and Fisher gone, the leadership of the Royal Navy took on a completely different complexion which has, traditionally, come in for a lot of criticism. The choice of Balfour and Jackson would seem to the outside observer to have had potential; Balfour had considerable experience of strategic questions, going back to his time as Prime Minister and founder of the Committee of Imperial Defence; and Jackson had spent years at the Admiralty and was a known expert in communications. But behind such appearances there were problems. Balfour had ‘more than a hint of laziness’ about him, and Jackson was a ‘dour and somewhat pessimistic Yorkshireman’ with ‘notmuch dash and verve or reforming zeal’. ProfessorMarder saw Balfour as ‘lethargic’ while Jackson lacked the ‘three aces’ of ‘leadership capacity, fertile imagination (except in scientific matters), and talent for using the brains and ideas of juniors’. They created a comatose Admiralty. Fisher thought that in Jackson's appointment all they could do was ‘hope for the best’. Their appointments were, however, asmuch political as anything else. The Churchill administration of the Admiralty had created tensions, and his, at times, eccentric behaviour, such as leading the defence of Antwerp in October 1914, had suggested that those who had earlier questioned his judgement were right.