I am in great suspense over the operations that will soon occur at the Rhine; I do not doubt that Napoleon will withdraw across this river. The operations on the other side of the Rhine will be so difficult and under such different circumstances that I am almost convinced that one is stronger in the defensive than in the offensive. Nevertheless, I hold it as completely decisive that one must cross the Rhine and continue the operations without delay until the peace, going all the way to Paris. His army is almost destroyed; maybe he can field 80,000–100,000 men in the face of double and triple the strength which one can oppose him. Leave him no time to form a new army, or to make an orderly halt until he reaches Paris. What was organized for the defense of the land is for the most part marching off with the cohorts, the remainder lacks artillery and a thousand other things. Everything which one can say against an operation in France and [against] Paris in particular is incorrect and misguided. A conspiracy in Paris, a revolt by the army, rebellion in the provinces will meet us halfway and one will easily have the two cornerstones of a durable peace with the liberation of Holland and Switzerland. But if one makes a formal halt on the Rhine, he will rebuild his army during the winter, and by early next year he will again have a strength of 200,000–300,000 men on the Rhine.