Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- 1 The New Charlemagne
- 2 Barbarians at the Gate
- 3 The Frankfurt Proposals
- 4 Napoleon and the French
- 5 The Left Bank
- 6 The Right Bank
- 7 The Lower Rhine
- 8 The Upper Rhine
- 9 The Middle Rhine
- 10 Alsace and Franche-Comté
- 11 The Vosges and the Saône
- 12 Lorraine
- 13 The Saar and the Moselle
- 14 Belgium
- 15 The Marne
- 16 Bourgogne, the Rhône, and the Aube
- 17 The Protocols of Langres
- Appendices
- APPENDIX A CLAUSEWITZ TO GNEISENAU
- APPENDIX B “REGARDING EACH SUGGESTION OVER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF THE ENEMY CROSSES THE RHINE” 31 OCTOBER 1813, BY RADETZKY
- APPENDIX C GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER: Regarding the Great Question of the Day
- APPENDIX D GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER, 24 NOVEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX E MÜFFLING'S PRO MEMORIA OF 29 DECEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX F THE FRANKFURT DECLARATION
- APPENDIX G BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE DUTCH
- APPENDIX H BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE BELGIANS
- APPENDIX I HIMBERT DE FLEGNY TO THE MAYORS OF THE VOSGES DEPARTMENT, 9 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX J GNEISENAU TO RADETZKY
- APPENDIX K GNEISENAU TO KNESEBECK
- APPENDIX L MACDONALD'S PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE 25TH MILITARY DISTRICT
- APPENDIX M NAPOLEON TO METTERNICH, 16 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX N VICTOR TO BERTHIER
- Bibliography
- Notes
- Index
APPENDIX M - NAPOLEON TO METTERNICH, 16 JANUARY 1814
from Appendices
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- 1 The New Charlemagne
- 2 Barbarians at the Gate
- 3 The Frankfurt Proposals
- 4 Napoleon and the French
- 5 The Left Bank
- 6 The Right Bank
- 7 The Lower Rhine
- 8 The Upper Rhine
- 9 The Middle Rhine
- 10 Alsace and Franche-Comté
- 11 The Vosges and the Saône
- 12 Lorraine
- 13 The Saar and the Moselle
- 14 Belgium
- 15 The Marne
- 16 Bourgogne, the Rhône, and the Aube
- 17 The Protocols of Langres
- Appendices
- APPENDIX A CLAUSEWITZ TO GNEISENAU
- APPENDIX B “REGARDING EACH SUGGESTION OVER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF THE ENEMY CROSSES THE RHINE” 31 OCTOBER 1813, BY RADETZKY
- APPENDIX C GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER: Regarding the Great Question of the Day
- APPENDIX D GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER, 24 NOVEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX E MÜFFLING'S PRO MEMORIA OF 29 DECEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX F THE FRANKFURT DECLARATION
- APPENDIX G BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE DUTCH
- APPENDIX H BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE BELGIANS
- APPENDIX I HIMBERT DE FLEGNY TO THE MAYORS OF THE VOSGES DEPARTMENT, 9 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX J GNEISENAU TO RADETZKY
- APPENDIX K GNEISENAU TO KNESEBECK
- APPENDIX L MACDONALD'S PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE 25TH MILITARY DISTRICT
- APPENDIX M NAPOLEON TO METTERNICH, 16 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX N VICTOR TO BERTHIER
- Bibliography
- Notes
- Index
Summary
The delays that the negotiations experience are not attributable either to France or Austria, yet they will suffer the most from them. The Allied armies have already invaded several of our provinces: if they advance further, a battle will be inevitable, and surely the foresight of Austria must calculate and weigh the consequences that would attend such a battle, whether lost by the Allies or by France.
Writing to a minister as enlightened as you, it is not necessary that I should explain these consequences. I shall limit myself to merely hinting at them, being assured that they cannot escape your view.
The chances of war are growing greater each day. In proportion, as the Allies advance, their forces diminish, while the French armies are constantly receiving reinforcements. The Allied advance inspires with two-fold courage a nation that feels it has its greatest and dearest interests to defend. The consequences of a battle lost by the Allies, would not be so fatal to any as to Austria; she being both the chief of the Allies and one of the central powers of Europe.
Supposing Fortune should continue to favor the Allies, it is doubtlessly important for Austria to attentively consider the situation of Europe after a battle lost by the French in the heart of France, and whether such an event would not produce consequences diametrically opposite to the equilibrium that Austria seeks to establish, and at the same time hostile to her policy and the personal and family affections of Kaiser Francis.
Finally, Austria insists that she wishes for peace; but is she not likely to fall short of her goal, or perhaps to overreach it by continuing hostilities, when both parties wish to end them?
These considerations lead me to presume that in the present situation of the respective armies, and in this severe season of the year, a suspension of hostilities would be mutually advantageous to both parties.
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- The Fall of Napoleon , pp. 569 - 570Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007