The creation of a safe-haven for al Qa'ida–linked Salafi jihadists in northern Mali was a phase shift in the North African terrorist threat to the region and to the West. Uncontested sanctuary gave al Qa'ida's allies the chance to accelerate their recruitment, build training camps, enrich themselves more fully from regional smuggling, enlarge their field of operations along multiple vectors regionwide, and plot attacks on enemies, near and far.

If the kidnapping scourge had focused French national attention on the Sahel intermittently for at least three years, the birth of “Malistan” in 2012 combined with the Merah attacks made Mali a top foreign policy issue in a presidential election otherwise focused largely on domestic issues. There was a creeping acceptance on both sides of the political aisle that the French approach to the problem posed by the spread of jihadists in the Sahel was not working and more needed to be done. Sarkozy, however, had eschewed direct action, likely out of a fear about the impact a mishap would have on a presidential campaign he was already losing.

When Hollande defeated Sarkozy in the May 6, 2012 elections, his foreign policy advisors knew Mali would be their first major test. What was at stake in the region was “immensely important” to France, as one senior French diplomat later put it. It wasn't just that the French had a “moral duty” to do something in their former colonial space. The crisis was taking place “right in their backyard,” a fact that gave France a special interest in addressing the problem. At the same time, proximity also meant that Paris was better positioned and better informed about the issue than many other capitals, including Washington – although Paris by no means enjoyed perfect information about what was going on in Bamako's fraught political scene, let alone the desolate northern reaches of the country.

Most of all, France was the only Western power for whom Mali was genuinely a priority. The United States remained focused on Afghanistan and increasingly oriented toward the Asia Pacific. The United Kingdom was entering a period of intense introspection. Germany was still inclined toward its traditional “checkbook” diplomacy – in Africa and elsewhere.