It was under these tenuous circumstances, with the bulk of the original jihadist forces chased from Mali's territory, French forces bent on withdrawing as fast they could, and an uncertain transition to a UN peacekeeping force under way, that the focus began to shift back toward Mali's fraught political scene and the daunting state-building task ahead. American officials – especially the State Department – had emphasized the importance of the political dimension of reconstruction all along, stressing the need for reconciliation between the Tuaregs and political elites in Bamako as well as the restoration of democracy through national elections. French political and military leaders likewise recalled the desultory outcome of the NATO intervention in Libya two years earlier, where initial military success had been followed by a rudderless and almost nonexistent international postwar effort – and consequent strategic failure.

As they withdrew, the French were thus sensitive to the possibility that their military gains could soon slip away absent rapid progress on political fronts. Al Qa'ida was at bay, but Mali's problems ran deep. As Traoré put it, “the fact that Mali collapsed in so few days was not a good sign.” There were no illusions that the military itself could offer a permanent solution for the challenge. “It's not the French army that will ensure Mali's future,” a senior official said a year after Serval was launched. Addressing the political piece of the problem would be critical.

Three major challenges called for immediate and near-simultaneous attention. First, political, military, administrative, and other institutions had to be rebuilt on multiple fronts. Major efforts to reduce corruption and strengthen the postwar state were clearly required. To truly regain its sovereignty and independence, the Malian state also needed reliable security forces that could hold the north without direct support from France or the United Nations. These were a long way off.

Second, Traoré's interim government had functioned as well as one might have hoped, but it was widely agreed that Mali needed to get an elected government back in place as soon as possible. Without an elected government, the United States would be limited in what it could contribute to reconstruction. More importantly, most officials thought it would be fruitless for the interim government to try to move ahead toward a settlement with the north.