The French intervention in Mali was unexpected but, if unexpected, it was in many ways unexpectedly successful. This is true despite the challenges that persisted in Mali after France's drawdown. Without the French intervention, the situation in Mali was and would have remained even worse. Serval was thus only the first step in a long-term effort, but it bears close study given the challenge the world faces in coping with the unnerving proliferation of Salafi jihadist groups across the Middle East and North Africa. The threat from Bin Laden's al Qa'ida has been greatly reduced, but the world now faces a new problem with al Qa'ida's offspring – al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, al Shabab and others – as well as now established competitors such as ISIS. Needless to say, military force is not alone the solution to these threats. It is part of the solution, however, and to expect progress without the use of force would be naïve. Developing appropriate military strategies is pressing. To design a strategy for combatting Salafi jihadists in North Africa and understand accurately the options for military strategy there – and in other regions – requires assessing what the French accomplished in 2013 and why.

DID THE FRENCH MODEL SUCCEED?

The French model in Mali involved a small to medium sized conventional force, many times larger than a typical special operations unit, but a fraction of the size of the forces deployed by the United States and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The primary objective of the force was counterinsurgency, especially the prevention and destruction of a terrorist safe haven. The operation, though longer than French leaders hoped, was still limited in duration, with French forces starting to redeploy or draw down only a few months after it began. To destroy the safe haven in Mali, the French military took ground, but it left much of the responsibility for holding the ground up to UN and Malian forces. Parallel initiatives were undertaken on state-building and resolving the underlying conflict that opened the door to al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb in the first place.

Most French officials and experts are decidedly positive about what this model accomplished. “A major success” said one, “even better than we expected.”