Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 France, Mali, and African Jihad
- 2 Al Qa'ida's North African Franchise
- 3 Hostages, Ransoms, and French Security Policy
- 4 Merah and Malistan
- 5 Leading Africa from Behind
- 6 Crisis and Opportunity
- 7 Serval
- 8 The Elusive “Political” Dimension
- 9 The Road Ahead
- Annex 1
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Serval
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 France, Mali, and African Jihad
- 2 Al Qa'ida's North African Franchise
- 3 Hostages, Ransoms, and French Security Policy
- 4 Merah and Malistan
- 5 Leading Africa from Behind
- 6 Crisis and Opportunity
- 7 Serval
- 8 The Elusive “Political” Dimension
- 9 The Road Ahead
- Annex 1
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The first two weeks of French operations saved Mali from falling into the hands of al Qa'ida's allies. With the Niger Bend now secure, Hollande was determined to chase the jihadists out altogether, and then withdraw as fast as possible. The sudden French attack seemed to have caught the jihadists by surprise, and the French leadership now sought to exploit this advantage to the maximum. In the Elysée, Hollande pressed the military to speed ahead, despite the risks – to an extent that surprised even some of his military advisors. France had paid the price of intervention from the moment it took action, the president reasoned, and now it was time to get as much out of the effort as they could. Clearly the last thing the French president wanted was to be bogged down in an African quagmire. “The orders to the troops were to keep the initiative. Don't give them time to regroup,” explained the commander of the operation, General Grégoire de Saint-Quentin, in his underground Paris bunker a year later.
No one knew what lay in store for French forces across the Niger, however. Political success meant not only delivering large numbers of jihadists, it also meant prevailing on the local and regional forces to take over as much as they could handle, as soon as possible, so the French troops could exit swiftly.
This would thus become a war of speed, long distances, and rapid engagements, not to mention punishing heat. From an operational perspective, the emphasis on speed meant there would be no significant fortifications for the troops, who would move rapidly in small units in a sometimes-haphazard charge into the northern desert. The orders recalled General Patton's words to his troops on the eve of their departure for the North African campaign in World War II: “If you have any doubts as to what you're to do, I can put it very simply. The idea is to move ahead, and you usually know where the front is by the sound of gunfire.” The French troops, though, would not have the benefit, such as it were, of the sound of gunfire for orientation. Instead, the vast expanses of the Sahara opened up silently before them.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The French War on Al Qa'ida in Africa , pp. 112 - 143Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015