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This chapter addresses influential computational models of the mind. In the first section, we look at the physical symbol system hypothesis proposed by Herbert Simon and Allen Newell. The hypothesis suggests that thinking is a process of manipulating symbol structures according to well-defined rules. Next, we introduce Jerry Fodor's language of thought hypothesis which proposes that thinking has a language-like grammatical structure. We explain why the language of thought hypothesis is a concrete practice of the physical symbol system hypothesis in the human cognitive system. The last section explores an argument against the physical symbol theory developed by John Searle. His Russian (Chinese) room argument is intended to refute the claim that manipulating symbols is sufficient for intelligence.
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