A movement from Switzerland and the upper Rhine into the French interior is not only possible and can be executed with speed, but it can also be very decisive. However, it does not represent a continuation of the march from Leipzig to the Rhine, and makes no use of the results of the battle of Leipzig. The enemy has been driven back on the single point of Mainz. It is therefore completely advisable to now chose a point of conquest where: 1) the combined [Allied] armies have shorter lines and 2) the provinces do not belong to France proper so that the dispositions of the subjects are not inherently loyal to France. As a result of the battle of Leipzig, Holland, the German provinces on the other side of the Rhine, and perhaps also Brabant can be conquered without bloodshed; but if the spirit of the Dutch nation and the Germans of the left bank is left in chains, if the fortresses are provisioned and garrisoned, the conquest of Holland will thus require the work of many years. According to the current position, the combined army will lose thirty days moving to the upper Rhine and Switzerland. This movement will further allow the enemy … to empty all of his Dutch fortresses in order to appear in the field with significant force, and both reasons taken together demand the assumption that this movement will allow the enemy sufficient time to free the forces needed for a battle on the Seine, a supposition which a movement on Holland completely rules out.