Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- 1 The New Charlemagne
- 2 Barbarians at the Gate
- 3 The Frankfurt Proposals
- 4 Napoleon and the French
- 5 The Left Bank
- 6 The Right Bank
- 7 The Lower Rhine
- 8 The Upper Rhine
- 9 The Middle Rhine
- 10 Alsace and Franche-Comté
- 11 The Vosges and the Saône
- 12 Lorraine
- 13 The Saar and the Moselle
- 14 Belgium
- 15 The Marne
- 16 Bourgogne, the Rhône, and the Aube
- 17 The Protocols of Langres
- Appendices
- APPENDIX A CLAUSEWITZ TO GNEISENAU
- APPENDIX B “REGARDING EACH SUGGESTION OVER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF THE ENEMY CROSSES THE RHINE” 31 OCTOBER 1813, BY RADETZKY
- APPENDIX C GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER: Regarding the Great Question of the Day
- APPENDIX D GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER, 24 NOVEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX E MÜFFLING'S PRO MEMORIA OF 29 DECEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX F THE FRANKFURT DECLARATION
- APPENDIX G BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE DUTCH
- APPENDIX H BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE BELGIANS
- APPENDIX I HIMBERT DE FLEGNY TO THE MAYORS OF THE VOSGES DEPARTMENT, 9 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX J GNEISENAU TO RADETZKY
- APPENDIX K GNEISENAU TO KNESEBECK
- APPENDIX L MACDONALD'S PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE 25TH MILITARY DISTRICT
- APPENDIX M NAPOLEON TO METTERNICH, 16 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX N VICTOR TO BERTHIER
- Bibliography
- Notes
- Index
APPENDIX E - MÜFFLING'S PRO MEMORIA OF 29 DECEMBER 1813
from Appendices
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- 1 The New Charlemagne
- 2 Barbarians at the Gate
- 3 The Frankfurt Proposals
- 4 Napoleon and the French
- 5 The Left Bank
- 6 The Right Bank
- 7 The Lower Rhine
- 8 The Upper Rhine
- 9 The Middle Rhine
- 10 Alsace and Franche-Comté
- 11 The Vosges and the Saône
- 12 Lorraine
- 13 The Saar and the Moselle
- 14 Belgium
- 15 The Marne
- 16 Bourgogne, the Rhône, and the Aube
- 17 The Protocols of Langres
- Appendices
- APPENDIX A CLAUSEWITZ TO GNEISENAU
- APPENDIX B “REGARDING EACH SUGGESTION OVER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF THE ENEMY CROSSES THE RHINE” 31 OCTOBER 1813, BY RADETZKY
- APPENDIX C GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER: Regarding the Great Question of the Day
- APPENDIX D GNEISENAU TO ALEXANDER, 24 NOVEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX E MÜFFLING'S PRO MEMORIA OF 29 DECEMBER 1813
- APPENDIX F THE FRANKFURT DECLARATION
- APPENDIX G BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE DUTCH
- APPENDIX H BÜLOW'S PROCLAMATION TO THE BELGIANS
- APPENDIX I HIMBERT DE FLEGNY TO THE MAYORS OF THE VOSGES DEPARTMENT, 9 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX J GNEISENAU TO RADETZKY
- APPENDIX K GNEISENAU TO KNESEBECK
- APPENDIX L MACDONALD'S PROCLAMATION TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE 25TH MILITARY DISTRICT
- APPENDIX M NAPOLEON TO METTERNICH, 16 JANUARY 1814
- APPENDIX N VICTOR TO BERTHIER
- Bibliography
- Notes
- Index
Summary
A movement from Switzerland and the upper Rhine into the French interior is not only possible and can be executed with speed, but it can also be very decisive. However, it does not represent a continuation of the march from Leipzig to the Rhine, and makes no use of the results of the battle of Leipzig. The enemy has been driven back on the single point of Mainz. It is therefore completely advisable to now chose a point of conquest where: 1) the combined [Allied] armies have shorter lines and 2) the provinces do not belong to France proper so that the dispositions of the subjects are not inherently loyal to France. As a result of the battle of Leipzig, Holland, the German provinces on the other side of the Rhine, and perhaps also Brabant can be conquered without bloodshed; but if the spirit of the Dutch nation and the Germans of the left bank is left in chains, if the fortresses are provisioned and garrisoned, the conquest of Holland will thus require the work of many years. According to the current position, the combined army will lose thirty days moving to the upper Rhine and Switzerland. This movement will further allow the enemy … to empty all of his Dutch fortresses in order to appear in the field with significant force, and both reasons taken together demand the assumption that this movement will allow the enemy sufficient time to free the forces needed for a battle on the Seine, a supposition which a movement on Holland completely rules out.
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Fall of Napoleon , pp. 562Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007