In the last few years, the world has witnessed a deeply troubling spread of violent extremist groups across North Africa and the Middle East. Al Qa'ida has proven tenacious and rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) has meanwhile opened a whole new era in the history of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, in the Middle East as well as North Africa. From Iraq to Syria to Libya, the United States, its allies, and its partners have confronted the challenge of developing a military strategy that can be both effective against such groups and also politically saleable to domestic populations reluctant to engage again in large-scale counterinsurgency missions of the type the United States undertook in the decade after the 9/11 attacks. The French found such a strategy in their 2013 intervention against al Qa'ida in Mali. France was able relatively quickly, and at a relatively low cost, to eliminate a major al Qa'ida safe haven, restore Mali's integrity, and deal a major blow to the regional terrorist groups that threatened Mali, France, and many other countries. Mali is a poor, weak country with multiple conflicts that have yet to be resolved. It could again descend, as Libya did after the 2011 NATO intervention there, into civil war. But there is little question that the French intervention had an overall positive effect.

Most literature on intervention strategy in the United States focuses on the U.S. experience alone. By bringing the experience of a key ally to light for an American audience, I hope this book will add a valuable perspective to counter-terrorism strategy debate within the U.S. policy and academic community.

I am as grateful as ever, if not more so, for the willingness of many people to contribute valuable time and support to the research and thinking that went into this project. In Paris, I was very lucky to have several of the most knowledgeable experts in the field of French strategic studies and African affairs give time to the project, including Etienne de Durand, Camille Grand, Philippe Gros, Nathalie Guibert, Marc Hecker, Isabelle Laserre, Antonio Missiroli, and Jean-Jacques Patry. In the United States, Jolyon Howorth, Leo Michel, and Douglas Porch contributed sound advice on French military affairs.